There has been a growing interest in improving ventilation control of droplet/airborne transmitted diseases in buildings and hospitals since the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemics in Hong Kong and elsewhere between November 2002 and June 2003. However, such ventilation control measures were considered without a positive international consensus on the possibility of airborne transmission of the SARS virus. SARS virus is considered to be primarily transmitted by large droplets and close contact. Did air flow and ventilation in buildings play any roles in the transmission of SARS virus during the SARS epidemics? This paper reviews published possible/probable evidences/reports of airborne transmission and the roles played by air flow pattern and building ventilation in a number of the so-called super spreading events. It was probably these possible or probable evidences that have led to the consideration of airborne precaution in controlling SARS spread in some countries or some guidelines. The unfortunate SARS epidemics have given us a painful lesson in terms of basic building services design and maintenance including the failure of the simple water seal traps in the Amoy Gardens housing estate in Hong Kong, possible roles played by building ventilation and air flows in hospitals. The problem of “proving” airborne transmission of a disease is a very complex one. The importance of accurate information on the possibility of airborne transmission is obvious as the